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Abstract
We analyze the incentives for cost-reducing R&D by downstream
ﬁrms in a two-tier market structure. Downstream R&D increases the
demand for an input, thereby allowing the upstream ﬁrm to raise the
input price. While it lowers the beneﬁt of R&D to a downstream
ﬁrm, such a price adjustment by the input supplier leads to a higher
production cost for all rival ﬁrms. Due to this “raising rivals’ cost”
eﬀect, a downstream oligopolist may invest more in R&D than does
a downstream monopolist, a phenomenon that does not occur in a
purely horizontal setting. Fixed-price agreements under which the
input price remains unchanged in response to downstream R&D promote innovation by eliminating the opportunistic behavior of the input
supplier. In general, the incentive for downstream R&D is positively
related to input pricing rigidity
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Introduction

There is by now a huge body of literature dealing with various aspects of
innovative R&D1 with much attention focused on horizontal R&D in industries where ﬁrms are competitors on the product market. In this paper we
extend our understanding of horizontal R&D by considering innovations in
vertically related industries.
In markets that involve two tiers of producers such as upstream input suppliers and downstream manufacturers, innovations by downstream producers
inevitably aﬀect upstream suppliers. For example, cost-reducing R&D by automobile makers enable them to lower prices and sell more cars, which leads
to the increased purchase of auto parts. Innovative activities by a computer
retailer like Dell brings beneﬁts to suppliers of components (such as chips)
and complementary products (such as software), in addition to themselves.
It is obvious that innovations by downstream producers will lead to increased
demand for the inputs they use in their production, which is beneﬁcial to the
input suppliers.2 Taking this as our point of departure, we study how this
aﬀects the R&D incentive of downstream producers.
We ﬁnd that the increased demand for the input may allow suppliers to
increase the input price while selling more of the input. We derive conditions
under which this price increase takes place for general demand functions
for the ﬁnal product: essentially, cost-reduction downstream must make the
derived demand curve for the input steeper. We then show that this price
increase has two opposing eﬀects on the R&D incentive of a downstream
producer. While the higher input price oﬀsets some of the cost reduction
of the downstream ﬁrm from the R&D (a negative incentive eﬀect), the
1
2

See Reinganum (1989) for a detailed survey.
See Lee (1996) for an analysis of this demand-pull eﬀect of the investment by Japanese

machine tools users on the tool suppliers.
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increase in input price applies to all the other downstream ﬁrms as well.
Therefore the R&D by the downstream ﬁrm indirectly raises the production
cost of its competitors (a positive incentive eﬀect). We show that due to
this raising rivals’ cost (RRC) eﬀect, downstream ﬁrms may have a stronger
incentive to do R&D when the degree of downstream competition is low. In
particular, we show that downstream oligopolists each invest more in R&D
than a downstream monopoly, provided the number of ﬁrms is not too large
(fewer than 6 in the case of linear demand). Of course such a scenario could
never arise in standard horizontal R&D settings.
The tendency for the upstream suppliers to raise the input price after the
downstream producers have conducted their R&D can be viewed as a type
of opportunistic behavior on the part of the suppliers. One way to overcome
this negative incentive eﬀect is for the suppliers and the manufacturers to
sign a ﬁxed input price contract. Under this type of contract, the suppliers
agree not to change the input price in response to downstream R&D, a kind
of long-term input price agreement. We show that while this type of contract
eliminates the RRC incentive for R&D, the net eﬀect is that ﬁrms are more
innovative than under the ﬂoating price arrangement. Our results shed light
on why vertically related ﬁrms may often engage in long term contractual
relationships regardless of other considerations.
To highlight the positive relationship between input pricing rigidity and
the incentive for downstream R&D, as well as to isolate the RRC eﬀect,
we consider the case where the input supplier is able to price discriminate
among downstream producers. We show that such increased ﬂexibility in
input pricing by the upstream supplier further hinders the downstream R&D
incentive for R&D, relative to the uniform but ﬂoating price arrangement.
Under price discrimination, the monopoly supplier can raise the input price
for an innovating downstream producer without having to raise the prices
of its other rival ﬁrms. Therefore, the RRC eﬀect is absent under price
3

discrimination and consequently, the equilibrium R&D level is lower than
under uniform pricing.
Our paper is related to several branches of the industrial organization
literature. First, it contributes to the literature on horizontal R&D which
has received a great deal of attention in the past two decades. This strand
typically examines the R&D incentives of ﬁrms competing in the product
market, abstracting from the upstream suppliers of inputs. In such a pure
horizontal R&D set-up, a ﬁrm’s cost-reducing investment enables it to steal
market share from its rivals without aﬀecting their cost structures. The main
questions addressed here have included the impact of the degree of product
market competition on ﬁrm R&D incentives, the eﬀect of R&D cooperation,
the implication of R&D spillovers, and the design of public policy to best
induce welfare improving innovative activities by private ﬁrms. One of the
well-understood results in this literature is that (for non-drastic innovations)
ﬁrms’ R&D investment levels decline as the number of competitors increase
because increased competition erodes the return to innovation. Our paper
is among the ﬁrst to extend the R&D literature into a vertical setting by
focusing on the eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s R&D investment on its rivals channelled
through the reactions of an upstream supplier. Our analysis identiﬁes the
RRC eﬀect of R&D because of which a downstream duopolist invests more
in R&D than does a downstream monopoly.
Secondly, the general idea of a ﬁrm obtaining a competitive advantage
through strategic actions that can raise rivals’ costs is not new in the industrial organization literature. For example, Salop and Scheﬀman (1983) argue
that a ﬁrm can raise the costs of production of its rivals by means of inducing supplier group boycotts, promoting industry-wide labor unionization,
lobbying for more government regulations, and so on. In models of vertical
integration and foreclosure, Salinger (1988) and Ordover, Saloner and Salop
(1990) show that a downstream ﬁrm may strategically acquire an input sup4

plier with the purpose of reducing upstream competition and hence raising
the input price for its downstream competitors. In this paper we show that
an RRC eﬀect also exists when downstream ﬁrms engage in cost-reducing
R&D, where the eﬀect is channelled through the increased demand for the
input resulting from downstream R&D.
Our paper is also related to the study of investment incentives of ﬁrms
in the bilateral ‘hold-up’ problem.3 One fundamental insight from this line
of research is that in the presence of asset speciﬁcity, ﬁrms who are about
to form a bilateral partnership tend to underinvest as each fears the possible
post-investment exploitation by the other party. Two ways to overcome such
“opportunistic behavior” are for the parties to form a single ﬁrm (through
vertical integration, for example) or to contract through a third party. Our
analysis of ﬁxed-price contracting is very much in the same spirit of mitigating the “opportunistic behavior” of the upstream ﬁrm.
Fixed-price arrangements in the context of R&D have received some attention recently from McLaren (1999) who contrasts them with informal
agreements (“handshakes”) between upstream suppliers and downstream customers. He shows that ﬁxed price contracting encourages autonomous innovation by the upstream supplier, but handshake arrangements are better for
promoting joint innovation by both the supplier and the customer. Our focus
however is diﬀerent: we look exclusively at downstream R&D and consider
the role of ﬁxed-price contracts in mitigating the RRC eﬀect.4
Finally, some recent studies on R&D incorporate a two-tier structure
but focus on research questions that are diﬀerent from ours. Steurs (1995)
and Inkmann (1999) extended the horizontal R&D literature by adding an
3
4

See Williamson (1975) and Klein (1988), for example.
The RRC eﬀect is absent in McLaren’s model because the output of each downstream

producer is normalized to unity so that the demand for the input is independent of downstream research investment.
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upstream market into the model of d’Asprémont and Jacquemin (1988) and
explore the eﬀects of intra- and inter-industry spillovers. Stefanadis (1997)
analyzes the relationship of upstream R&D and vertical foreclosure, and
shows that an upstream supplier has an incentive to “capture” a downstream
user in order to reduce the customer base for another upstream ﬁrm’s R&D.
In a model of vertical research joint ventures (VRJVs), Banerjee and Lin
(2001) look at the incentives of upstream and downstream ﬁrms in forming
VRJVs and examine the equilibrium VRJV size under diﬀerent cost-sharing
rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we look at
general demand and derive the suﬃcient condition for downstream R&D to
increase the input price charged by the upstream supplier. In Section 3, we
analyze the RRC eﬀect of R&D in the linear demand set-up and show how
the RRC eﬀect and the equilibrium R&D investment vary with the number
of ﬁrms. Section 4 shows that a ﬁxed-price contract can serve as a means
of mitigating the opportunistic behavior of upstream suppliers and thus promote downstream R&D. Section 5 considers diﬀerential pricing contracts and
Section 6 concludes.

2

Suﬃcient Conditions for Raising the Input
Price

Consider a two-tier industry with one upstream ﬁrm, U , and n downstream
ﬁrms indexed by Dj , j = 1, ..., n. The upstream ﬁrm supplies an intermediate
good to the downstream ﬁrms whose output of the ﬁnal product is {qj }.
The cost of production for the upstream ﬁrm is normalized to zero. The
ﬁnal good is produced with a ﬁxed-coeﬃcient technology (one unit of ﬁnal
product requiring exactly one unit of the input), with the marginal cost of
6

transforming the intermediate good into the ﬁnal good being cj . Let w be
the price of the intermediate good. Thus, the marginal cost of producing the
ﬁnal good for downstream ﬁrm Dj is w +cj . The inverse demand for the ﬁnal
good is given by p = p(Q) where p < 0 and Q =

n

j=1 qj .

The downstream

ﬁrms compete in Cournot fashion in the market for the ﬁnal product.
Given the input price w set by the upstream supplier, ﬁrm Dj maximizes
p(Q)qj − (w + cj )qj .
The ﬁrst order condition is
p(Q∗ ) + p (Q∗ )qj∗ = w + cj ,
where Q∗ =
is 2p (Q∗ ) +

n

∗
j=1 qj .
p (Q∗ )qj∗

j = 1, . . . , n

(1)

The second order suﬃcient condition for a maximum
< 0. The system of equations in (1) determine the

Cournot equilibrium output levels in the downstream market. Summing up
these ﬁrst order conditions over all j we get
np(Q∗ ) + p (Q∗ )Q∗ = nw +

n

c
j=1 j

(2)

which implicitly deﬁnes the derived demand for the input Q∗ = Q∗ (w, c1 , . . . , cn ).
Diﬀerentiating (2) with respect to cj and w yields
1
∂Q∗
=
< 0 and
∂cj
(n + 1)p (·) + p (·)Q∗

∂Q∗
n
< 0,
=
∂w
(n + 1)p + p (·)Q∗
(3)

where the sign follows from summing across the second order conditions for
all n downstream ﬁrms. Since

∂Q∗
∂cj

< 0, it implies that cost-reducing R&D

by any downstream ﬁrm raises the demand for the input.
The upstream ﬁrm then maximizes its proﬁt w·Q∗ (w, c1 , . . . , cn ) by choosing the input price w, yielding the ﬁrst order condition
Q∗ + w∗

∂Q∗
= 0.
∂w
7

(4)

Equation (4) implicitly deﬁnes the equilibrium input price w∗ = w∗ (c1 , ..., cn ).
To see the impact of downstream R&D on the equilibrium input price, we
diﬀerentiate (4) with respect to cj and rearrange terms, yielding
∗

2

∗

∂Q
∂ Q
+ w∗ ∂w∂c
∂w∗
∂cj
j
.
=  ∂Q∗
∂ 2 Q∗
∗
∂cj
− 2 ∂w + w ∂w2

(5)

The denominator is positive by the second order condition of U ’s maximization problem. Since
negative is

∂ 2 Q∗
∂w∂cj

∂Q∗
∂cj

< 0 from (3), a suﬃcient condition for

∂w∗
∂cj

to be

≤ 0. From (3), we get


∂ 2 Q∗
(n + 2)p (·) + p (·)Q∗
∂Q∗
=
−
∂w∂cj
[(n + 1)p (·) + p (·)Q∗ ]2
∂w



which is non-positive if (n + 2)p (·) + p (·)Q ≤ 0 at Q∗ . Therefore, we have
the following result.
Proposition 1 For general demand function p(Q) with p < 0, a reduction
in a downstream ﬁrm’s marginal cost will cause the input price to go up if
(n+2)p +p Q ≤ 0 at the equilibrium Cournot quantity Q∗ (w∗ , c1 , c2 , . . . , cn ).
The condition that

∂2Q
∂w∂cj

is non-positive simply says that downstream

R&D makes the derived demand steeper. Note that this condition holds in
the special case of linear demand p = a − Q since p = p = 0.
It is useful to contrast our vertical two-tier market structure with the
standard one-tier horizontal R&D setting. In the latter, a ﬁrm’s cost-reducing
R&D investment serves the sole purpose of increasing its cost advantage over
its rivals by lowering its cost of production. In our model, however, R&D by
a downstream ﬁrm has an additional “strategic eﬀect” on its competitors:
downstream R&D by increasing the demand for the intermediate good could
result in a higher input price for all the downstream ﬁrms. Although the
increased input price partially oﬀsets the cost-reduction of the ﬁrm that
8

does R&D, it also provides this ﬁrm with a new incentive for downstream
R&D, namely to raise its rivals’ costs, an eﬀect which is absent in standard
horizontal settings. Thus R&D by a downstream producer not only confers
on it a cost advantage relative to its rivals, but it additionally raises its rivals’
absolute cost through the input price adjustments in the upstream market.
In the next section, we explore this raising rivals’ cost (RRC) eﬀect when the
demand for the ﬁnal product is linear to see how this aﬀects a downstream
ﬁrm’s incentive for R&D.

3

Raising Rivals’ Cost Incentive for R&D:
The Case of Linear Demand

Suppose the inverse demand for the ﬁnal good is linear: p = a − Q, a >
0. The marginal cost of transforming the input good into the ﬁnal good
for ﬁrm Dj is c − yj , where yj is the cost-reduction as a result of R&D
undertaken by ﬁrm Dj . For simplicity, assume that the R&D cost is given
by γyj2 . Throughout the paper, it is assumed that γ ≥ 1 so that the R&D
cost function is convex enough to guarantee the validity of the second order
conditions for R&D maximization problems. As in the previous section,
the downstream ﬁrms make R&D decisions simultaneously. Then the input
supplier sets the price of the input and the downstream ﬁrms compete in the
market for the ﬁnal product. We solve the equilibrium R&D investment using
the standard backward induction procedure. In this simple set-up, we will
be able to see clearly how the RRC eﬀect inﬂuences ﬁrms’ R&D decisions.
Given their R&D decisions and the price of the input, w, the downstream
ﬁrms compete in Cournot fashion, resulting in an output level of
a − c − w + (n + 1)yj −
qj =
n+1
9

n
k=1

yk

(6)

for any j, k = 1, 2, . . . , n, j = k. The derived demand for the input is thus
Q=



n(a − c − w) +
qj =
n+1



yj

,

or equivalently,

n+1
1
yj −
Q.
n
n
The upstream ﬁrm simply sets the input price at the monopoly level
w =a−c+



a−c+
w =
2
∗

yj /n

.

(7)

Substituting this into the inverse demand function for the input, we get the
equilibrium aggregate output


n (a − c + yj /n)
.
Q =
2(n + 1)
∗

(8)

Before proceeding further, it is useful now to note that ﬁrm Dj ’s overall
marginal cost is
∗

w + c − yj =

a+c+



yk /n − 2yj
,
2

implying that
2n − 1
∂(w∗ + c − yj )
=−
∂yj
2n

and

1
∂(w∗ + c − yj )
=
for k = j,
∂yk
2n

a result summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 1 A unit reduction in ﬁrm Dj ’s marginal transformation cost de1
creases its overall marginal cost by 1 − 2n
and raises each rival ﬁrm’s overall

marginal cost by

1
.
2n

Lemma 1 indicates the existence of the RRC eﬀect and how this eﬀect
depends on the degree of downstream competition. As n rises, each individual
10

downstream ﬁrm becomes smaller relative to the industry (its Cournot output
declines). So a drop in its unit cost will not shift the demand for the input as
much. Thus, the increase in the input price is smaller, resulting in a weaker
RRC eﬀect on its rival ﬁrms.
Substituting for w∗ from equation (7) into equation (6), we get the downstream Cournot quantities


qj =



1
(a − c) + 2 (n + 1)yj −
yk −
yk /n
2(n + 1)

and proﬁts
πjD = [a −



qk − (w∗ + c − yj )]qj = (qj )2 .

At the R&D stage, each downstream ﬁrm chooses yj to maximize πjD −γyj2 .
Solving the ﬁrst order condition and imposing the symmetry condition yj =
y ∗ , we obtain the equilibrium R&D level for each downstream ﬁrm5
y ∗ (n) =

a−c
,
γH(n) − 1

where

4(n + 1)2 n
H(n) ≡
.
2n2 − 1
To illustrate the RRC eﬀect on ﬁrm incentive to conduct R&D, compare the
case of a successive monopoly (n = 1) with that of a downstream duopoly
(n = 2). We have
y ∗ (1) =

a−c
a−c
.
and y ∗ (2) = 72
16γ − 1
γ
−
1
7

Therefore, y ∗ (2) > y ∗ (1); a downstream duopolist invests more in R&D than
does a downstream monopolist. If n = 3, then H(3) =
∗

∗

192
17

>

72
.
7

Thus

∗

y (3) < y (2). It can be easily shown that y (n) further decreases with n for
all n ≥ 3 and that the following result holds.
5

(2n −1)
The second order condition for the R&D maximization problem is 4n
2 (n+1)2 ≤ γ. Since
2

2

the lefthand side is always less than 1, the assumed condition γ ≥ 1 is suﬃcient to fulﬁll
this requirement.

11

Proposition 2 If γ ≥ 1, then y ∗ (n) increases as n goes from 1 to 2 and
then decreases with n > 2. In particular, y ∗ (n) > y ∗ (1) for n < 6.
Proof . Ignoring that n is an integer, H  (n) has the same sign as 2n3 −
2n2 − 3n − 1, which is positive if and only if is n ≥ 2. The second part of
the proposition can be proven by noting that y ∗ (n) > y ∗ (1) if and only if
H(n) < 16. This latter inequality is equivalent to n3 − 6n2 + n + 4 < 0, which
holds if and only if n < 6.
Proposition 2 can be understood as follows. An increase in n impacts
R&D in two ways. First, increased competition in the ﬁnal product market
reduces the output for each downstream ﬁrm and erodes its proﬁts, which
tends to reduce their incentive for cost-reducing R&D. This eﬀect leads to a
monotonic decline of equilibrium R&D with the number of producers in the
usual horizontal setting.6 In our two-tier model however, there is a second
and opposing factor, the RRC eﬀect which is unique to a vertical setting, that
promotes the initial increase of equilibrium R&D as we go from a downstream
monopoly (where the RRC eﬀect is absent) to a downstream duopoly. Indeed,
the RRC incentive for downstream R&D is quite strong: compared to the
case of downstream monopoly, downstream oligopolists invest more in R&D
than a monopolist as long as n < 6.
At the symmetric equilibrium, the proﬁt of each downstream ﬁrm net of
R&D cost is
πjD − γ(y ∗ )2 =

(a − c + y ∗ )2
− γ(y ∗ )2
4(n + 1)2


=
6

(γHy ∗ )2
γ2H 2
∗ 2
−
γ(y
)
=
− γ (y ∗ )2 .
4(n + 1)2
4(n + 1)2

See d’Asprémont and Jacquemin (1988), and Suzumura (1992) for example.
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(9)

Noting (8), the proﬁt of the upstream supplier is,
n (a − c + y ∗ )2
nγ 2 H 2 (y ∗ )2
=
.
π =w·Q=
4(n + 1)
4(n + 1)
U

4

(10)

Fixed-Price Contract

Although ex post it is optimal for the upstream ﬁrms to raise the input
price after the downstream ﬁrms have completed their R&D projects, such a
price adjustment obviously hurts the R&D incentive of the downtream ﬁrms.
Since reduced downstream R&D means lowered demand for the input, it is in
the interest of the upstream suppliers ex ante to ﬁnd ways to alleviate or to
eliminate the ‘opportunistic behavior’ of raising the input price. Suppose the
ﬁrms can write a contract wherein the input price cannot be changed after
R&D, i.e., the input price is chosen before R&D is undertaken and stays ﬁxed
thereafter. This type of arrangement can be viewed as a long-term contractual relationship whereby the upstream and the downstream ﬁrms commit
to a prespeciﬁed input price even if the downstream ﬁrms increase the quantity of the input purchased from the supplier. In this section, we show that
this type of arrangement promotes R&D by eliminating the ‘opportunistic
behavior’ on the part of the supplier. While the arguments are made in the
case of linear demand, it should be clear that the intuition carries over to
more general demand as well.
Under a ﬁxed-price contract, the price level for the input is chosen ﬁrst
and remains ﬁxed forever. Given w, the downstream ﬁrms simultaneously
choose their R&D investment levels, yj . Given w and these R&D levels,
Cournot competition downstream yields the following quantity for ﬁrm Dj
(same as equation (6)):
a − c − w + nyj −
qj =
n+1
13


k=j

yk

.

The proﬁt of Dj is then
πjD = (p − w − c + yj )qj = (qj )2 .
At the R&D stage, ﬁrm Dj maximizes πjD − γyj2 , taking w as given. The
corresponding ﬁrst order condition is
a − c − w + nyj −
2n
(n + 1)2


k=j

yk

= 2γyj .

(11)

The symmetric equilibrium R&D level is thus
y(w) =

a−c−w
.
γ(n + 1)2 /n − 1

(12)

As is to be expected, the downstream R&D level depends negatively on the
level of input price.
The total output corresponding to the symmetric R&D equilibrium is




n
1
Q(w) = nqj =
+ 1 (a − c − w)
n + 1 γ(n + 1)2 /n − 1
=

γ(n + 1)(a − c − w)
.
γ(n + 1)2 /n − 1

Anticipating the relationship given by y(w), the upstream supplier chooses
an input price w to maximize its proﬁt w ·Q(w). The solution to this problem
is
wf = (a − c)/2.

(13)

Substituting this into equation (12), we get the equilibrium R&D level
under the ﬁxed-price contract:
yf (n) ≡ y(wf ) =

a−c
1
·
.
2 γ(n + 1)2 /n − 1

It is then easily seen that yf (n) > y ∗ (n) because 2n/(2n2 − 1) > 1/n.

14

Proposition 3 Fixed-price contract by a upstream monopolist promotes downstream R&D, i.e., yf (n) > y ∗ (n) for all n and γ ≥ 1.
Under the ﬁxed-price contract, the upstream supplier commits not to
raise the input price after downstream ﬁrms conduct cost-reducing R&D.
This encourages R&D by the downstream producers by increasing the direct
beneﬁts of innovation to those producers. Although the RRC incentive for
R&D (which is conducive to downstream innovation) is also eliminated, the
positive direct eﬀect is so strong that the downstream producers end up
investing more in R&D under a ﬁxed-price contract.
From equation (11), each downstream ﬁrm’s net proﬁt under the ﬁxed
price contract can be calculated to be


πjD

− γy

2

2

= (qj ) − γy =


=

2

n+1
γ
n

2

n+1
γ
n

2



− γ · [y(w∗ )]2

 

1
a−c
−γ ·
2 γ(n + 1)2 /n − 1

2

.

(14)

The proﬁt of the upstream ﬁrm is


(a − c)2
π = w · Q(w ) =
4
U

∗

∗





γ(n + 1)
.
γ(n + 1)2 /n − 1

(15)

Can the R&D-stimulating ﬁxed price contract be beneﬁcial to all ﬁrms
including the upstream ﬁrm, relative to the case analyzed in Section 3? Intuitively, the downstream ﬁrms should be better oﬀ under a ﬁxed contract
as the input price cannot increase after their R&D projects are completed.
There are two opposing eﬀects at work for the upstream ﬁrm. First, ﬁrm U ’s
proﬁt tends to go down as it cannot raise input price to take advantage of
the increased input demand. Second, because downstream producers invest
more in R&D and thus buy more of the input from it, the upstream supplier’s proﬁt tends to increase. The net eﬀect on the upstream ﬁrm therefore
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depends on which of these two eﬀects is stronger. Unfortunately, algebraic
complexity does not permit analytical results regarding the ranking of ﬁrm
proﬁts under ﬁxed contract (equations (14) and (15)) versus when the input
price can respond to downstream R&D (equations (9) and (10)). But numerical simulations reveal that the second eﬀect always dominates the ﬁrst
so that ﬁxed input price contract increases the proﬁts of both the upstream
and the downstream ﬁrms.
Proposition 4 Assuming that the demand for the ﬁnal product is linear and
the R&D cost function is γy 2 , a ﬁxed price contract by an upstream monopoly
makes all ﬁrms better oﬀ for all n > 1 and γ ≥ 1.
Since industry output increases with the R&D level, consumers also beneﬁt with the increased innovation. Thus, the ﬁxed-price contract analyzed
above improves social welfare as well.

5

Price Discrimination

In this section, we consider the case that the upstream monopolist is able
to charge each downstream producer a diﬀerent price wj . The upstream
supplier enjoys the most freedom in adjusting the input price under price
discrimination—although it also has the ﬂexibility to change the input price
under the ﬂoating price arrangement considered in Section 3, the input supplier in that case must charge all its n customers a uniform price. We make
two points in this section. First, when the upstream supplier engages in
price discrimination, the RRC eﬀect is absent. As a result, equilibrium R&D
monotonically decreases with the number of downstream ﬁrms, as is the case
in a horizontal R&D settings. Secondly, we show that the equilibrium R&D
level under price discrimination is even lower than that under the uniform
ﬂoating price arrangement. This, together with the result for ﬁxed-price
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contract, tells us that price ﬂexibility by the upstream supplier discourages
downstream R&D.
Given the input price vector w = (w1, w2 , ..., wn ) and R&D investment
vector y = (y1 , y2, ..., yn ), downstream Cournot output levels are
a − (n + 1)(wj + c − yj ) +
qj (w, y) =
n+1

n

k=1 (wk

+ c − yk )

.

(16)

Thus qj (w, y) is the derived demand for the input by ﬁrm Dj , which, as is
to be expected, depends on the cost conditions of its rival ﬁrms.
The upstream ﬁrm then chooses the vector of input prices w so as to
maximize

n

j=1

wj · qj (w, y). The ﬁrst order conditions are

a − (n + 1)(wj + c − yj ) +
n+1

n

k=1 (wk

+ c − yk )

−


n
∂qk
=0
wj + k=j wk
n+1
∂wj

which simpliﬁes to
a − c + (n + 1)yj −

n

y − 2(n + 1)wj + 2
k=1 k

n
k=1

wk = 0.

(17)

Summing up these ﬁrst order conditions over j, we get
2

n
j=1

wj = n(a − c) +

n
j=1

yj .

Substituting this into (17) yields the optimal prices for the upstream supplier:
wj =

a − c + yj
.
2

(18)

Here downstream R&D by ﬁrm Dj raises its own input price only. The input
prices for other rival ﬁrms are independent of Dj ’s R&D investment, and
consequently the RRC eﬀect is not present under price discrimination.7
7

The intuition for this is as follows. From (16), we have

∂qj
∂yj

=

n
n+1

and

∂qk
∂yj

1
= − n+1
,

for k = j. Thus, cost-reducing R&D by a downstream ﬁrm Dj increases its derived demand
for the input and decreases the derived demand for the input by all its rival ﬁrms. This
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Substituting the optimal input prices into the expressions for qj (w, y)
and after some simpliﬁcation, we get


a − c + nyj −
qj (y) =
2(n + 1)

k=j

yk

.

The corresponding proﬁt of ﬁrm Dj is thus


πjD



a − c + nyj −
=
2(n + 1)

k=j

yk

2

.

At the R&D stage, ﬁrm Dj chooses yj to maximizes it proﬁt πjD −γyj2 yielding
the following ﬁrst order condition:


a − c + nyj −
4(n + 1)2

k=j

yk

· n = γyj

The symmetric R&D equilibrium level under price discrimination is thus
given by
yd (n) =

a−c
.
4γ(n + 1)2 /n − 1

It can be easily seen that yd is smaller than y ∗ because n2 /(2n2 − 1) < 1.
Combining this with the result in Proposition 3, we have:
Proposition 5 The equilibrium R&D level is highest under the ﬁxed-price
contract and lowest under price discrimination, i.e., yd (n) < y ∗ (n) < yf (n).
One can also compare the prices under the three scenarios we have considered. From equations (7), (13), (18) and the above proposition, we obtain
suggests that following R&D investment by Dj , the upstream monopoly will raise the
input price wj and lower all wk , j = k. However, if the upstream ﬁrm reduces input prices
for ﬁrms other than Dj , the derived demand by ﬁrm Dj declines, thus undermining the
eﬀort of the U -ﬁrm to take advantage of Dj ’s increased demand for the input. In the linear
demand set-up, it turns out that the U -ﬁrm, in maximizing its overall proﬁts, chooses not
to adjust other input prices in response to Dj ’s R&D.
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that the input price is the lowest under the ﬁxed price contract and highest
under uniform pricing. The upstream ﬁrm charges the lowest input price
under the ﬁxed contract because it cannot respond to the increase in the demand for the input caused by downstream R&D. That input price is higher
under uniform pricing than under price discrimination is a direct consequence
of the fact that downstream ﬁrms invest more in R&D under uniform pricing,
leading to a higher demand for the input. Further, since aggregate output is
positively related to downstream R&D, we conclude from the above proposition that the price of the ﬁnal product is lowest under the ﬁxed price contract
and highest under price discrimination.
The question of how price discrimination by an upstream input supplier
aﬀects downstream cost-reducing decisions was analyzed by DeGraba (1990).
DeGraba considers the case of a downstream duopoly and shows that the
downstream producers, who have two feasible technologies to choose from,
will select a technology with a higher marginal cost when the input supplier
price-discriminates than when it charges a uniform price. While DeGraba
was concerned with the welfare eﬀects of price discrimination, we in this
section simply emphasize the point that additional freedom on the part of
the supplier’s price-setting behavior further reduces the R&D incentive of
the downstream producers by removing the RRC eﬀect.

6

Conclusions

The insights from the analysis of R&D among ﬁrms in a vertical relationship
add considerably to those arising from the study of horizontal R&D alone
since the latter do not capture the interaction between the market tiers.
First, ﬁrms may only gain a relative cost advantage over their rivals under
horizontal R&D but with the introduction of the supplier-buyer relationship,
R&D by a ﬁrm may also raise their rivals’ absolute costs of production by
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increasing the per-unit price they have to pay for it. Consequently, increased
downstream competition may lead to a greater investment in R&D downstream due to the increase in rivals’ cost. We show that this is likely to
occur when upstream ﬁrms have suﬃcient market power over the price of the
intermediate good.
Second, although it is optimal for the upstream supplier to raise the input
price post-R&D, such adjustment hampers the downstream ﬁrms’ incentive
to innovate in the ﬁrst place. Reduced downstream R&D in turn hurts the
upstream supplier. We show that a long-term contract between the supplier
and the input buyers under which the input price is not allowed to change
as downstream ﬁrms innovate has the eﬀect of promoting innovation and
beneﬁting ﬁrms at both levels of the market. Thus, ﬁxed price contracts can
not only be a means of controlling production costs downstream, but can
also stimulate innovation downstream.
Our model with an upstream monopoly can be extended to one with an
oligopoly upstream. While it does not change the fact that downstream R&D
can increase the upstream input price by increasing the derived demand for
the input, having competition at the upstream level could change the degree
of the RRC eﬀect. If there is enough competition among the input suppliers,
a given increase in the derived demand for the input may not translate into
a large increase in its price. We believe that the basic results continue to
hold in a model with an oligopoly upstream as long as the number of input
suppliers is not too big. Regarding the feasibility of a ﬁxed-price contract,
a coordination problem may arise when there are more than one upstream
ﬁrms as to whether and how the input suppliers can ﬁxe input prices. One
arrangement could be the overt collusion among the input suppliers. As
long as the suppliers can agree not to change input prices in response to
downstream R&D, price cartel agreements among the suppliers (which are
per se illegal under the antitrust laws) may potentially be welfare improving
20

by encouraging downstream innovation.
One can also extend our analysis by adding R&D on the part of the
upstream ﬁrm as well. In such a situation, R&D activities by upstream and
downstream ﬁrms will be strategic complements and consequently increased
R&D investment downstream will induce the upstream ﬁrm to invest more
in R&D as well. We expect the basic results of our paper to hold in this
extended setting as well.
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